Rassegna storica del Risorgimento

Gladslong Q the [latitai Question January 1860 99
I went down to the second Cabinet, armcd with a beautiful spccch
and the resolution of a Cato. Jnhnny read an irrelcvanr lettor from Angus-
tus Loftus, and said: * 1 think, thereforft, without dcparling from anything
which I said the other day, that our best course will now he to ask the
Emperors of the Freuch and of Austria whether they would not both agree
to abstain from armed iiitcrferencc in Italy '. !) So Granville described
the meeting at whieb Palmereton, Russell and Gladstone bowed to the oppo-
sition of the Court, their colleagues and the Press (espccially the Times).
Loftus's despatch from Vienna was not quite irrelevant: it showed Austria
increasingly unwilling to take action in Italy. But it was clear the trium-
virate had overreached themselvcs. The crisis vanished into thin air.2)
The Queen was jubilant. And on 24 January Pahnerston caknly informed
the House of Comraons that there was no intcntion of forming any alliances.
This episode showed the Prime Minister that it was politically impossi-
ble to work with France. The annexation of Savoy and Nice completcd
his disillusionment. He henceforth pursued the popular course and head-
ed the alarmists in the invasion panics of 1860 and 1861. He found it
wiser to be pròItalian and anti-French and to be ofticially neutra!, as
Engbshmen on the wholc wished.
In the developmcnt of Gladstone's own thought on the Italian question, this letter marks no new stage. Unification did not yet seem to be -within the Hmits of what is practicablc, nor was it yet desirable in his opinion. It was only later that he spoke of Italian uni tv as the indispensable basis of ali eHectual reform under the peculiar circumstances of that country. 3) But it is notable that he now regarded Austria as an enemy, as he had since 1851 regarded * Bomba ' and the Pope. There was certamiy no more * Italian ' Cabinet minister than he, but he was also one of the least combative. 4) And at this very time he was working impossible hours on the commercial treaty with France, in the hope that it would help to preserve peace. He loved peace almost to a fault. Yet, as this letter Bhows, for the sake of Italy, he was prepared to risk war. There could be no better evidence of the extent of his enthusiasm for the Italian cause.
DEKEK BEALES
Prfvate [Windsor Cosile,] Jan. 3. 1860.
My dear Lord John Russell,
1 was not atvare tilt voe carne into the Cabinet Room today, hoio grave and dijficu.lt a question we were to discuss.
We have [ think two things to desire / mean within the limita of what is practicuble on behalf of Italy
First that force skould not be used from without to replace the governments overthrown in the Centrai States
i) Jbid., voi. E p. 369.
2> MAXWELL, op. eit. voi. Et, p. 204. 11 January. Clarendon to Lewis.
3) MonLEY, Ufe of Gladstone, voi. I. p. 402. To Errerà, Itiograpber or Manin (1872).