Rassegna storica del Risorgimento

100
Derek Beales
Seeondly that the question of their condition, relatively to external interven-lion, shuttli he brought to an early issue.
There may be those who say, why be impattanti le noi the statua quo m yourfavour, and have you anything to wish beyond its indefinite continunnce?
Il is in ourfavour negattvely, as il implies the absence ofwhat tee think shonid be absent It has been in our favour positively, as it ha gèn to the misunderstood populatUm of Central Italy an opporlunity of exhibiting their admirable qualities .
But hovo con any people ondare far an indefinite or a very long Urne to have their entire fate hanging in the balance, and that bàUatce, liabU at any moment to be decisively swayed by hands not their oum and even entirely ho'stile to what they have thoughi and done? They are subjected to the weak-ness of a provisionai Government to the spectacle of hostile arms on their frontier to the plots and inlrigues of a party which is at any rate not taeak amene the priesthood, and which through spiritual maehinery has admi­rable means of information and of tuming information to account They are cornpelled to meet the financial pressure of a war establishment, and being at the sante Urne regarded as rebels and outlaws by half Europe they are deprived even of sudi credit in the money market as a small state toith a Government professing to be permanenl might command. There is therefore I think the utmost hazard attendant upon prolonged delay.
As respects the exclusion offoreign force from the seltlement of the Central States, it need not be argued, for we are ali agreed.
Under these circumstances, you propose that we should prepare ourselves to give France an assurance that we will join Iter in resisting the imposition of a Government by force upon Central Italy. The tioo questions we have to ask ourselves are
1. Will this tend to render Tesori to force less probable in [word omitted Italy?] which is in other words to preserve the peace of Europe
2. Will il tend to an early seltlement of the question of a government for Central Italy.
It is argued against your proposition That it is a threat of war
That we can place no reliance on the Emperor ofthe French. That we should not be supporteti in it by public opinion That after having committed ourselves, though France recede we must persevero -
That theproper timefor considering the question witt be after the Congress has rnet, and after some pian involving the use of force shall have been proposed Now, as to the first of these reasons, I think the term applied is a mis-nomer we nominàlly threaten war only against those who shall already have made war. He only in realUy threatens war who threatens first to take up arms, not Ite who says he vM defend some body when attacked.
As respects reliance on the Emperor of the French generally, it may be true that we ought not lo venture it9 or tltatfr refusing it we at any rate take the safe ceurse. But as respects relying on him with regard to the EngUsh ajhance whert it may powerfuìly promote his views in Italy, in thislense
otÌr tlT ' " aPPmrS l mù tHat he ma* be "* P * * as other ptoies or Pnnces r