Rassegna storica del Risorgimento

Gladsionfi on the Italian Questìon jénuary 1860 103
The real and main quesUon I take il is thìs: cun M reasonably expeci to fina ia the Congress a better opportunily for declaring our principia and our intenti on fhan that which is nviv offered bifore il meets ?
A monili ago we invited Russia and Prussia to join us in limiting the action of the Congress, by excluding from it forcible restoration of the cxpelled Governrnents just as Frante and particularly as Austria, has limited it in othcr respccts, each in accordante with its own views. For a Congress is a body without definite righis, and one to which each Poicer is enti lied to aim at giving a direction accordi ng to its belief of what is just and politic Rus­sia and Prussia thought fit to decline giving us any clear indication Is it not naturai that we should seek in some othcr quarter for the strength in support of our principles which we had hoped to derive bui which we now find we cannai derive, from their avowed and positive concurrence? There is no great European combination pledged to use force in Central ltaly. Be it so. But there is one great temporal Power, and one great spiritual Power, secretly determined to strain every nerve in thal direction, There are two Great Poicers of Europe, Russia and Prussia, tv ho have heretofore been wont to act in the some sense. Sere are the elements of a formidable conspiracy. Shall we by a bold act before they are combined endeavour to put the combination out of the question, or shall [we] wait tilt they are enabled to combine in a regular or in something of an authoritative form, and thus with Franco set ourselves up as a minority in oppositiva to their views?
Your argument is that the decision which you invite us to take is likely to prevent any Resolution. to interfere by force in Central ltaly. You say Franco is now ready. She whom we have been soliciting, now solicits us: andsolicits us to act decisively in support ofthe principle which we first dcjinilively proclaimed, and have uniformly maintained.
What is the answer to you ? It would be a powerful reply to you indeed could it be said. this resolution which we are prematurely asked to take, will probably bring about the very decision which it aims at averting. But this no one has said. And I take it to be clear that while your proposai at the very least may prevent the combination which we look upon as so dangerous, there is not the slightest idea on the other hand, that it can invite or provoke such a combination.
There plainly exists, at least with Austria and the Pope, an intention towards ltaly with which we must deal as we would deal with an enemy. The ques­tion in regard to an enemy is, how to take him at the best advantage. At present the elements of mischief He before us, scattered and uncombined. In the Congress they will be dolimi with authority and susceptible of organisation. You invite us to deal with them promptly in their state of weakness. It is disagreeable to be broughl to so sharp an issue: but I must admit that delay really means giving advantage and strength to tluu which I tvant in the interest alike of peace and justice, to resisi and to baffle.
If the Congress cannai meet, I am sorry for it. The announcement that the project has been abortive,, will be a shock to public confidente already too mudi shaken. But the Congress was after ali chiefly valuable as a means to an end. Our chief motives for agreeing to enter it were that we might support and encourage Franco lo assist the cause of justice, peace and European order
and might bring the questions now depending to a speedy issue. But the
alliance with Franco is the trae basis of peace in Europe {for England and