Rassegna storica del Risorgimento

Documenti italiani e americani
53
I think there is al present no probability. Count Cavour* s policy is eminently
wise and pacific. His greal object is to consolidate the new Italian Kingdom
before exposing it to the perils of a war, so uncertain in its results, as must be
one with Austria at this lime. There is no reason to believe ihat he vaili be dri-
ven from his conservative position by any popular impulse. The recent returns
to the Italian Parliament show a large majority in accordance with his discreet
and enlightened policy. There is one dìsclosure made in this documenta of
which I toas noi previously apprised and which I think exhibits the Imperiai
Government to greal disadvantage as compared with the course of the British
Cabinet, It appears that on the 25th of July Count de Persigny read to Lord
John Russell a communicalion from Mr. Thouvenel to the effect that the French
and English government ought noi to alloro General Garibaldi to continuo his
progress unchecked, but that instructions should be given without delay to the
commanders of the French and English naval forces in the Mediterranean to
prevent him and his troops from crossing the Straits. In our opinion, says
the report, this measure limited strictly to its object, and directed against forelgn
volunteers in the Neapolitan Kingdom would not have constituted an act of
intervention between his Sicilian Majesty and his subjects. But in order to
avoid any question about its intentions, the French cabinet thoughtfit to act only
with the concurrence of England, which from recent Communications with the
London Cabinet, it seemed not impossible to obtain. The reply ofthe English
Cabinet to this proposai virtually decided the Italian question. The French
Ambassador was requested to communicate to the TuiUeries that Her Majesty7s
Government were of opinion that no case had been made out far a departure
on their part from their general principle of nonintervention: that the force
of Garibaldi was not in itself sufficient to overthrow the Neapolitan monarchy;
that it could only be defeated by the connivance and sympathy of the Neapolitan
army; that if Garibaldi were stopped by the fleets of Franco and England, the
governments of those countries would moke themselves virtually responsible
for whatever Bourbonist reactions might ajterwards take place, and that on these
grounds Her Majestys Government declined taking part with France in the
proposed armed intervention to arrest GarìbaldVs progress...
Giuseppe Garibaldi a Michele Pastacaldi. *)
Caprera, February 1, 1861.*) To M. Pastacaldi, Esq., 87 Pearl Street, New York, New York.
I received in due timo your draft on London, dated Sept. 11,1860, for 593 13s 2d., equal to 2,899.03, the result of contributions collecled by the Committee of which you are the treasurer. Please tender the expression of
1) Traduzione d'una lettera pubblicata nel quotidiano New York Herald, 2 marzo 1861. Questo estratto d'una lettera autografa di Garibaldi accusa ricevimento di tutti i contributi ricevati e spediti dal Comitato composto di V. Botta, E. P. Fabbri, M. Pastacaldi, G. Albinola, Dr. G. Ceccarini, O. Fabbriconi, E. J. Fabbri, G. Negrotti, G. Valerio, e G. Gajani.
2) Museo del Risorgimento, Milano, Basta n. 449.