Rassegna storica del Risorgimento

38
Howard R. Mar raro
French army is stili bere, and seems Ukcly to remain for sometirac aa they bave rcnted their depots, housos, etc, for tino years. But il' the Ally of Victor Emina* nuel, the Liberator introdueed iato ltaly by the Government of Sardinia, is to replace the worst forni of the ancient domination, it will in, the beginning produce complications here in which no MinUtry can stand up.
[Discute la cattiva posizione in cui si trova il Piemonte corno risultato della pace ... H ritorno dell'Imperatore francese e di Vittorio Emanuele a Torino]... The streets were lined with National Guards, but from the Windows were none of the gay draperics which dothe the walls of an Italian city e ven on the most ordinary fetes. The populatiou assembled behind the lines of the Guarda, evincing a naturai curiosity to see the great enigma of the age, but with looks devoid of sympathy; and during the whole procession, from ali that vast crowd, not one Viva l'Imperatore ! arose. The tclegraph will fornish a diflerent account to the journals, but of this fact I can assure you from personal observa-tion. My acauaintances stationed at different points ali state the same thing. I myself left my carriage and took a place among the people near the Palace gate. The Emperor passed within a few feet. Some persons cheerod the King Viva il Ke ! but not one, absolntely not one, mingled the nani? of the Emperor in the cry. It is my finn belief that if he had been alone no hat would have been raised. Napoleon received the marked slight with impassible composuxe. Once even he raised bis hat at a cheer for the King.
Such is a nailon's gratitude said the low voice of a priest dose to me. But Italians deny with vehemence that they owe at present any gratitude to Napoleon IH. They rose at his command and at bis invitation; they made every sacrifice and every effort demanded; he excited hopes which have been desperately disappointed; he promised to liberate them from foreign rule and then to leave them the choicc of their politicai destinies; he had the power to keep those promises; and he has not only left the Àustrians here but has ar-ranged their destinies , without even consnlting one of them and in notorious oppositioii to their wishes, by convention with their oldest and worst enemy. Before they throw away any more gratitude, say they, events must explain the incomprehensible treaty with which he has cut short their career. It is a treaty which can never be executed without the application of armed force.
[Discute la confederazione italiana... e il cambiamento avvenuto nella pò* litica di Napoleone rispetto all'Italia].
The Piedmoritese politicians who believed in the chivalrous and disinterested enthusiasm of their ally are reduced to the improbable supposition that his brain has been injurcd by the hot weather. But those who took an unfavorable view of the man from the first are less astonished than others. They account for ali on the theory of selfish calculation suceessfully accomplished. Napoleon, say these, had three ends in view: to satisfy the army that he was a great general; to convince the French that their sovereign was the most powerful in Europe; to destroy the increasing power of Austria in ltaly and to get for himself a pre-ponderating influence in the peninsula. At the date of the armistice ali these ends had been accomplished, and the extraordinary and unexpected unanimity with which ali ltaly dcclared for annexation and Victor Emmanuel satisfiod him that, if he wcnt farther, he miglit built up at his side a liberal kingdom so strong that it would cause him trouble. Hencc he made a peace with the Austrian despot which leaves him ali the glory and ali the influence of the war, while prò-