Rassegna storica del Risorgimento

618
oberi W. Bohl
Italy Consolidated and independent of priestly and of foreign dia ali on. it is readily seen, would prove a formidable politicai as wcll as commercial rivai to ali the states wkose territories border the Mediterranean and even lo En-Sland. Hence the narrato jealousy, which induced the allied powers in 1820 so to narrow the limita of the infuni kingdom of Greece timi, it could by no possi-bility attuili to lite posiHon of a truly independent self-sustaining state noto dictutes u like policy wkh regard to the vastly more probable growth and deve* lopment of the kingdom of Italy. In any event, a collision between Italy and Austria or between Italy and Trance, cannot long be delayed. x)
Nel frattempo, da Vienna, l'ambasciatore John Molle?, procurava al segre­tario di Stato nn eguale ed eccellente servizio di informazioni sulle questioni europee. Era stato compagno di corso di Bismarck all'Università di Berlino ed aveva una netta inclinazione verso la Germania, e più di una volta vide la necessità da parte austriaca di cedere il Veneto all'Italia. Quando la questione divenne enormemente complicata nel 1866, Motley riferì il suo pessimismo sul corso degli eventi:
I bave ultvuys believed in the imminence of a tour because l could forni no probable hypothesis on which peace could be preserved. Of course Austria could ubundon Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, but that scema noto to bave be-come impassìble. She could séll Vonice to Italy. Of that she udii never dream,
There is talk of a congress, to be proposed at the last moment by the Frendi Emperor, in order to prevent war. But is it imaginable that Prussia uoill alloiv a European congress to dispose of her claims on Schleswig-Holstein, or that Austria will submit its Venetìan possessions to its fiat? 2)
Dopo la fine della guerra, nel luglio 1866, Marsh prese un breve congedo, e lasciò l'ambasciata di Firenze in mano di Green Clay, incaricato d'affari. Que sii espresse la sua opinione ed insieme quella di quasi tutti gli Americani sulla questione italiana, quando riferì al segretario di Stato, Seward, nell'agosto 1866:
A lih ough 1 bave never shared the opinion of those tono believe the Em­peror Napoleon wishes to keep Italy in a state of quasi-vassalage to foreign powers, yet l think there is no doubt his tutelage of Italian interests in the pre-seni war has to u certain extent parulysed the military arm of the Kingdom. The wisdom of Count Cavour's policy in forming and maintaining the Franco* Italian alliance is beyond question, only in the hands of the weaker men who bave succeeded that great statesman, has il degenerated into a certain subser-viency to the imperiai will. It is now hoped and wìth every probability of realization that the present head of the cabinet vaili elevate the foreign po­licy of Italy to that dignity which reposes on the reciprocai respect and confi­denze of nation*.9)
l) Marsh a Seward, Torino, 2 febbraio 1864, ÌbtdH voi. 11, no. 83.
f) MoiJey a Seward, Vienna, 1 maggio 1866, ristampato in Foreign relations of the United States, 1M6. porte 1, p. 661, no. 168.
3i Ctay ÌI Seward, Firenze, 13 agosto 1866, Foreign A mitra Seclion, National Ar tìhjvee, Washington, D.C* Diplomatic Denputche; Italia, voi. 11. no. 153.