Rassegna storica del Risorgimento

158
Nick Carter
Malmesbury's severest criticism, however, was reserved for Azeglio, in regard to the abominable publication of Phillimore's opinion on the Ca­gliari, which had forced the Tory government to refer the whole question once again to the Law Officers. Malmesbury wrote with some asperity: I should like to hear a real account of Sardinian feelings and politics qua England. I find they are out of favour at the For[eign] Office] and with H[ouse] of C[ommons] . He also suggested to Hudson that Azeglio should perhaps be removed from London.37)
Malmesbury's difficulty was that the note of 5 January did, neverthe-less, exist On 22 March, Azeglio gave Malmesbury a copy of Cavour's most recent despatch to Naples regarding the Cagliari. In this, Cavour repeated his demand for the restitution of the vessel, cargo, and crew. Cavour's des­patch concluded: Ove il Gabinetto Napoletano persistesse del suo ingtustì-ficable rifiuto, il Governo del Re avviserà a quei provvedimenti che la gravità del caso e gli offesi diritti dello Stato potranno richiedere e consi­gliare. Azeglio then took the opportunity to formally request the support, and possibly the cooperation, of England pour mener à bonne fin cette grave affaire. In doing so he pointed out that, judging from the note of 5 January, England took the same view as Piedmont on the capture of die Cagliari.
Cette entente une fois établie, il ne peut qu'ètre utile et désirable que les deux Cabinets s'unissent par une action commune pour terminer une question dans laqueUe, non seulement les interéts de deux sujets Anglais sont gravement com-promis mais qui concerne d'une manière aussi ditecte toutes les Puissances mari-times également intéressées a ne pas laisser s'établir des précédents dangereux.38)
Quite clearly, Azeglio was following Harding's earlier advice to try and embarrass me English government into action.39)
reflectìon he considered that, while it might be officially rìght to hold Hudson responsible for not having checked the draft of the note, many of us would have done the same if we had a secretary in whom we could trust. As for the culprit, Erskine, however unless he was drunk, I cannot understand his turning a question to the Sardinian Government into a positive asscrtion from the British one. Hudson plcadcd, unsucccssfully, with Malmesbury to let Erskine remain at Turin, pointing out that Lord Clarcndon's despatch [of 29 Decom­ber] is, after ali, one long objectìon, which Erskine, in a ht of zeal, endeavoured to con­dense. Malmesbury to Hudson, 18 March 1858, HRO, MP, 9M73/54; Malmesbury to Hud­son, 8 Aprii 1858, HRO, MP, 9M74/54; Hudson to Malmesbury, 30 March 1858, HRO, MP, 9M73/13.
*) Malmesbury to Hudson, 15 March 1858, HRO, MP, 9M73/54. See also: E. d'Azeglio, undatcd, Cavour e l'Inghilterra cit, II (i), n. 1, p. 193.
38) E. d'Azeglio to Malmesbury, 22 March 1858, Correspondenee respeeting the Cagliari*, p. 124.
>) In this context see: Cavour to E. d'Azeglio, 18 and 19 March 1858, Cavour e llnghtherra cit, II (i), p. 198.